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"I'D GRAB AT ANYTHING. AND I'D
FORGET."
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE VICTIM
TESTIMONY AFTER DAVIS V.
WASHINGTON
NANCEE ALEXA BARTH*
Some folks whispered, some folks talked
But everybody looked the other way
And when time ran out there was no one about
On Independence Day...1

I.

INTRODUCTION
A.

'Ask Me '-

Ask Me. Ask Me. Ask Me. Here goes .... Pushes me, drops me
into the corner. Hair rips. A sharper pain. His shoe into my arm,
like a cut with a knife .... I curl up. My back screams. I don't
think, I don't look. I gather the pain .... [But] [d]o I actually
remember that? Is that exactly how it happened? Did my hair
* J.D. Candidate, May 2008. The author wishes to thank Professor
Susan L. Brody, Peter Isaac, and the 2007-2008 Editorial Board of The John
Marshall Law Review for their invaluable assistance in the writing of this
Comment. She is also grateful to the victim advocates at the Davidson County
District Attorney's Office in Nashville, Tennessee for originally inspiring her
to write this piece. The author would like to recognize her parents, Douglas
and Pamela Barth, for teaching her how to see the world through another's
eyes. She dedicates this Comment to Matthew James Hofheimer, the editor
who first challenged her to write with conviction.
1. MARTINA MCBRIDE, Independence Day, on MARTINA MCBRIDE
GREATEST HITS (RCA Records 2001).
2. RODDY DOYLE, THE WOMAN WHO WALKED INTO DOORS, 175, 186
(Penguin Books 1996).
This Comment utilizes portions of this novel (as
section titles or examples) to highlight the nature of domestic violence victim
storytelling. All of these excerpts are presented from the perspective of Paula
Spencer, the novel's protagonist and a victim of domestic violence. Although
admittedly disjointed and inconsistent, victim statements shed light on the
day-to-day experience of living in a home infected with violence. Because it is
only in the past thirty years that domestic violence has begun to be
recognized, these quotes stress the importance of asking victims about their
experiences in order to hear their answers. As this Comment will suggest, the
law, too, must listen to victim stories in order to combat domestic violence.
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rip .... When did it happen? What date? What day? I don't
know .... I'm messing around here. Making things up; a story ....
Hair rips. Why don't I just say He pulled my hair[?]
[Now] I have memories that I can touch .... I'm haunted all day
and all night. I have mistakes that stab me before I 3think of them.
He hit me, he thumped me, he raped me, it happened.
Paula Spencer's story4 mirrors the way in which many
domestic violence prosecutions unfold. 5
Although Paula has
memories of the abuse, once she is asked to relay those memories
to others, she begins to question her own accuracy. 6 She "loved
7
him," she "provoked him," she "was stupid," she "needed him."
Once social workers, advocates, police, or prosecutors enter the
scene; these are the phrases that we hear from domestic violence
victims.8 In the excerpt, Paula did not call the police, she did not
tell a friend or an advocate. Instead, she privately reflects on the
abuse that she endured for seventeen years. 9
What if Paula called 911 and then claimed she was "making
things up?" 0 Could the transcript of that call be used in a trial
against Charlo, her husband?1 1 If a neighbor heard her scream
and the police arrived to find Paula's clothing slashed, could the
police admit this evidence at trial to convict Charlo? 12 Would it
matter, if Paula "loved him" 13 too much to testify against him, that

3. Id. at 175, 183-85. Doyle's novel follows Paula Spencer through her
abusive relationship with her husband. Ironically, police kill Paula's husband
while pursuing him for an unrelated crime. Id.
4. DOYLE, supra note 2. Paula Spencer is the novel's protagonist. Id.
5. See generally Amanda Dekki, Note, Punishment or Rehabilitation? The
Case for State-Mandated Guidelines for Batterer Intervention Programs in
Domestic Violence Cases, 18 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 549, 552-65 (2004)
(outlining the components of community responses to domestic violence and
advocating the use of Batterer Intervention Programs to rehabilitate
batterers).
6. DOYLE, supra note 2, at 184.
7. Id. at 177.
8. See Connecticut v. Borelli, 629 A.2d 1105, 1113 (Conn. 1993) (finding
expert testimony on Battered Women's Syndrome admissible). In this case,
the witness, Stark, was introduced to help explain why the victim recanted on
the stand. Id. Stark testified that battered women commonly fail to report
their problems or delay reporting them to the authorities or others, that even
though these women have suffered extraordinary harm, they minimize or even
deny the harm that they have suffered, and there is the "paradoxical
situation... where a woman will come in on one occasion and present a very
clear and concise picture of danger that she's in, either explaining it to her
health provider or to a police officer, and then a week later completely change
her story." Id.
9. DOYLE, supra note 2.
10. Id. at 184.
11. Id. Charlo is the name of Paula's abusive husband in Doyle's novel. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
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the years of abuse happened at all? 14
B. One Answer
First, this Comment will identify the frequency with which
incidents of domestic violence occur in the United States and how
these incidents have been treated by the criminal justice system to
date. 15 Second, it will trace the evolution of mandatory and
evidence-based prosecutions and the importance of hearsay
evidence in domestic violence cases. Third, it will explore the
pertinent psychological effects on female victims of intimate
violence and how this bears upon victims' experiences in court.
Fourth, it will analyze the Supreme Court's recent decision in
Davis v. Washington16 and its forthcoming impact on domestic
violence prosecutions. Last, it will suggest how the Davis decision
will impact the way prosecutors and police approach domestic
violence cases and what state legislative measures should be taken
in the wake of Davis to ensure that the voices of victims are heard.
II. BACKGROUND
17
A. The Origins of Domestic Violence: "It Happened"

In the landmark decision Planned Parenthoodof Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey,18 Justice Sandra Day O'Connor spoke of
the pervasiveness of domestic violence:

14. Id. at 183.
15. The author recognizes that domestic violence is a problem that affects
families and is often perpetuated from parents to children: boys, who are hit
by their mothers, go on to abuse their own wives. The question then becomes,
should the man be punished for a behavior he learned from a parent? See
LINDA G. MILLS,

INSULT TO INJURY: RETHINKING OUR RESPONSES TO

INTIMATE ABUSE 1-10 (Princeton Univ. Press 2003) (discussing the deeply
engrained nature of family violence). Even though there are incidents where
men are the victims of domestic abuse, the author chooses to focus on male-tofemale violence. As a result, the victim will always be, to use the traditional
term, a battered woman. To illustrate the overwhelming prevalence of maleto-female violence: in 1994, thirty-seven percent of women injured by violence
and treated in an emergency room were injured by an intimate partner, while
less than five percent of men injured by violence and treated in an emergency
room were injured by an intimate partner. DEP'T OF JUSTICE SPECIAL
REPORT: VIOLENCE-RELATED INJURIES TREATED IN HOSPITAL EMERGENCY

ROOM DEPARTMENTS, NCJ-178247, 5 (1997).
16. 547 U.S. 813 (2006).
17. DOYLE, supra note 2, at 184.
18. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). Casey held that the spousal notification portion of
the Pennsylvania abortion statute was invalid because it required a woman to
notify her husband of her intention to abort the fetus before exercising her
freedom of choice to do so. Id. at 898. The Court related spousal and family
violence data to show that the spousal notification requirement was a
substantial obstacle to battered women obtaining an abortion. Id. at 893-94.
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Studies reveal that family violence occurs in two million families in
the United States. This figure, however, is a conservative one that
substantially understates (because battering is not usually reported
until it reaches life-threatening proportions) the actual number of
families affected ....In fact, researchers estimate that one of every
two women will be battered at some time in their life ....
19
Between 1996 and 2001, 1,551,143 incidents of family
violence were reported in the United States. 20 Of these incidents,
21
the most prevalent relationship context was boyfriend/girlfriend.
The spousal relationship context was a close second. 22 As these
findings indicate, domestic violence truly is an epidemic.
23
During the 1970s, mainstream feminists recognized this fact
24
and began to reform institutional responses to domestic violence.
However, it was not until after the Simpson-Goldman murders in
1994 that most states instituted mandatory arrest and no-drop
prosecution policies. 25 Advocates of these measures believed that

19. Id. at 888. The opinion goes on to say that "women of all class levels,
educational backgrounds, and racial, ethnic and religious groups are
battered." Id. at 889. Further, "[b]attering husbands often threaten their
wives.., with further abuse if she tells an outsider of the violence and [her
husband] tells her that nobody will believe her." Id. at 889-90. "A battered
woman, therefore, is highly unlikely to disclose the violence... for fear of
retaliation by the abuser." Id. "Even when confronted directly by... helping
professionals, battered women often will not admit to the battering because
they have not admitted to themselves that they are battered." Id. at 890.
20. National Criminal Justice Reference Service,
http://www.ncjrs.gov/spotlight/family-violence/facts.html (last visited Feb. 25,
2008). This fact sheet reports the findings of a 2004 family violence study
conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Uniform Crime Reporting
(UCR) Program. Id. Local, county, and state law enforcement agencies report
incidents from twenty-two crime categories to the UCR. Id. The data is
representative of twenty percent of the United States population and sixteen
percent of the total crime statistics collected by the UCR program. Id. It is
important to note that this study only accounts for reported incidents of family
violence between 1996 and 2001. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 888 (finding that
most incidents of domestic violence are not reported until they are lifethreatening).
21. National Criminal Justice Reference Service, supra note 20. 29.6
percent of the total violent incidents reported was between boyfriends and
girlfriends. Id.
22. Id. 24.4 percent of the violent incidents in 1996 to 2001 were between
husbands and wives. Id.
23. MILLS, supra note 15, at 34-36.
24. Id. at 34.
25. G. Kristian Miccio, A House Divided: Mandatory Arrest, Domestic
Violence, and the Conservatization of the Battered Women's Movement, 42
HOUS. L. REV. 237, 238-43 (2005). "With the death of Nicole Brown, politicians
raced to the state house to invoke domestic violence laws, jumping on the 'zero
tolerance' bandwagon." Id. at 238. Mandatory arrest requires that police
officers arrest a suspect if he or she has reason to believe that an assault has
occurred, regardless of the victim's consent or objection. MILLS, supra note 15,
at 36. Currently, the federal government encourages mandatory arrest and
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they would force professionals to treat intimate violent crimes the
same way as stranger crimes, thereby ensuring that batterers
26
were punished by the criminal justice system.
Mandatory arrest and prosecution policies succeeded in
bringing attention to the Battered Women's Movement and
27
characterizing intimate violence as a crime under the law.
prosecution by providing federal funds to jurisdictions that adopt such policies.
Id. at 37. Similarly, no-drop policies encourage prosecutors to pursue domestic
violence cases regardless of the victim's wishes. Id. at 40. Other no-drop
policies are more flexible and take the battered woman's wishes into account
when deciding whether to go forward with criminal charges. Id.
26. Id. at 35. See generally Naomi R. Cahn, Innovative Approaches to the
Prosecution of Domestic Violence Crimes, in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: THE
CHANGING CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESPONSE 161, 162-75 (E.S. Buzawa & C.G.

Buzawa, eds., 1992) (describing no-drop policies as emphasizing the fact that
prosecutors control decision-making about the case by precluding victims from
Prosecutors, as part of the executive branch of
dropping charges).
government, are allowed discretion with regard to how laws should be
implemented. Id. at 162. Traditionally, prosecutors assumed that domestic
violence is trivial, and because women often do not follow through with the
charges in domestic violence cases, they waste prosecutorial resources. Id. at
162-63. Mandatory prosecution policies allow for prosecutorial discretion,
while preventing victims from dropping the case. Id. at 168. Proponents of
no-drop policies argue that they force prosecutors to take domestic violence
cases seriously and acknowledge that domestic violence is a crime against
society. Id. In contrast, opponents of no-drop policies argue that victims
should have the right to decide whether they want intervention from the
criminal justice system. Id. Two examples serve to illustrate the mandatory
prosecution controversy: Duluth, Georgia initiated a "case-by-case" approach
to encouraging prosecution as opposed to a "hard no-drop policy," and after
several years found that the abuser was intimidating the victim, while a study
in Indianapolis found that where the victim "initiated the prosecution,
recidivism decreased when victims had control over whether to drop charges
and decided not to drop charges." Id.
27. See Miccio, supra note 25, at 238-43 (discussing the ways in which
mandatory prosecutions succeeded). "They criminaliz[ed] conduct that the
justice system and society previously had sanctioned." Id. at 240; see also
CLARE DALTON & ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN AND THE LAW

564-65 (Foundation Press 2001) (providing a list of behaviors by abusers that
fit into the confines of traditional crimes). Dalton and Schneider list assault,
assault and battery, assault and battery on an officer, assault and battery
with a dangerous weapon, attempt to commit a crime, breaking and entering,
criminal trespass, disorderly conduct, disturbing the peace, willful and
malicious destruction of property, harassing phone calls, violation of a
restraining order, and intimidation of a witness. Id. Kidnapping, attempted
homicide and homicide, rape and sexual assault, and stalking should also be
added. Id. Rape and sexual assault are problematic criminal categories for
married persons because many victims do not realize that they have the "right
to refuse sex with an intimate partner" and the law is "slow and reluctant" to
recognize that the "marriage license is not a license to rape." Id.; see also Joan
Zorza, The Criminal Law of Misdemeanor Domestic Violence, 1970-1990, 83 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 46, 50 (1992) (tracing the development of spousal
abuse). In 1970, when feminists began reformation of domestic violence
practices, American law did not recognize marital rape as a crime. Id.

The John MarshallLaw Review

[41:937

Despite these strides, however, the continuing efficacy of
mandatory arrest and prosecution is questionable. 28
While
mandatory arrest laws increase the number of domestic violence
cases filed, prosecutors continue to find it difficult to successfully
prosecute domestic violence cases because victims recant, request
that charges be dropped, or refuse to testify against their
29
abusers.
B. Evidence-Based Prosecutions: "[T]he burn on
my hand? The missing hair? The teeth?"30
To avoid problems with victim testimony, prosecutors of
domestic violence cases often employ practices known as evidencebased or victimless prosecutions. 31 Prosecutors build their cases
on physical evidence such as photographs of injuries and through
witness statements to the police, medical personnel, or social
workers. 32 Calls made to 911 and victim statements play an
important role in victimless prosecutions. 33 Many times the victim
is the only witness and her out-of-court statements, if admitted as
hearsay exceptions, are necessary to prove essential elements of
34
the crime.
28. See National Criminal Justice Reference Service, supra note 20
(reporting a remarkable number of violent family situations between 1996 and
2001); see also MILLS, supra note 15, at 35 (finding that mainstream feminists
were too zealous in their reformation policies and thought they could change
the discriminatory attitudes of police officers and prosecutors by forcefully
changing their policies); DALTON AND SCHNEIDER, supra note 27, at 621
(acknowledging the tension between proponents and opponents of no-drop
prosecution policies). If prosecutorial discretion is left to the victim, batterers
become more aggressive. Casey G. Gwinn & Sergeant Anne O'Dell, Stopping
the Violence: The Role of the Police Officer and Prosecutor,20 W. ST. U. L. REV.
297, 310-11 (1993). This is because, "[b]y definition, most batterers have the
power in violent relationships." Id. at 310. "When the system demanded that
the victim act in the role of prosecutor, in reality the batterer was being given
control of the criminal case." Id. "Once prosecutors ... stop asking victims
whether they want to press charges, they quickly find that victims stop asking
to press charges or drop charges." Id. Still, victim advocates argue that some
victims have "good reason to fear" the consequences of pursuing prosecution.
DALTON AND SCHNEIDER, supra note 27, at 622. These same advocates fear
that no-drop policies coerce victims into cooperation, rather than encouraging
them to seek help from the criminal justice system. Id.
29. Geetanjli Malhotra, Note, Resolving the Ambiguity Behind the BrightLine Rule: The Effect of Crawford v. Washington on the Admissibility of 911
Calls in Evidence-Based Domestic Violence Prosecutions, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV.
205, 213 (2006).
30. DOYLE, supra note 2, at 164.
31. MILLS, supra note 15, at 40. Because domestic violence victims often
recant, prosecutors treat such cases similarly to homicides, "as though no
victim was available to testify." Id.
32. Malhotra, supranote 29, at 214.
33. Id.
34. Id. 'The evidence-based approach is a powerful weapon for prosecutors
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When a prosecutor offers a victim's accusatory statement into
evidence, hearsay rules are implicated. 35 A statement such as, "he
(the defendant) is the one who hit me," is hearsay because it is
offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted: the defendant
committed a battery upon the victim. 36 However, if the victim's
previous, out-of-court accusatory statement falls under a
legitimate hearsay exception, then that statement may be
37
admissible against the defendant.
Additionally, the Sixth Amendment provides a criminal
defendant with the right "to be confronted with the witnesses
against him."38 If the victim refuses to testify against her abuser
at trial, her accusatory statement cannot be cross-examined and
the use of that statement violates the defendant's Constitutional
right to confront his accuser. 39
Ohio v. Roberts40 was the first Supreme Court case to define
the boundaries of admissibility for an out- of-court statement
where the out-of-court declarant is unavailable. 41 Roberts found
that where a witness is unavailable for cross-examination at the
present proceeding, her statement is admissible only if it "bears
adequate 'indicia of reliability."' 42 The controversial decision in
Crawford v. Washington43 rejected the Roberts framework and
found that admitting statements deemed reliable by a judge is
fundamentally at odds with the right of Confrontation. 44 The
Crawford Court left "for another day any effort to spell out a

fighting the domestic-abuse battle because it allows prosecutors to take legal
action against the abuser without relying on the victim's cooperation." Id. at
214-15.
35. See Michael D. Cicchini & Vincent Rust, Confrontation After Crawford
v. Washington: Defining "Testimonial", 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 531, 532
(2006) (suggesting that the Court define testimonial evidence to include all

accusatory hearsay).
36. Id.
37. The statement could be admitted as a "present sense impression," FED.
R. EVID. 803(1), or as an "excited utterance," FED. R. EVID. 803(2).
38. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
39. See Cicchini & Rust, supra note 35, at 532 (providing where the state
calls a police officer to testify that the victim told him, "the defendant is the
person who attacked me," the statement is not only hearsay (because it is

offered for the truth of the matter asserted: the accused is the attacker), but
should be inadmissible under the Confrontation Clause as an accusatory
statement).
40. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
41. See id. at 65. (finding that the Sixth Amendment operates to restrict the
range of admissible hearsay when a witness is shown to be unavailable).
42. Id. "Reliability can be inferred without more in a case where the
evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception. In other cases, the
evidence must be excluded, at least absent a showing of particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness." Id.
43. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).

44. Id. at 60. The Court overruled Ohio v. Roberts. Id. at 75.
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comprehensive definition of 'testimonial,"' (beyond noting that
testimonial statements are made with an eye toward future
prosecution) and left in its wake a great burden on evidence-based
prosecutions. 45 With the recent Supreme Court decision Davis v.
47
Washington,46 the day to define testimonial has come.
4s
C. "Makingthings up": Recanting a Story of Violence

Before turning to the Davis decision and its impact on
domestic violence prosecutions, it is important to understand the
abusive dynamic that often prevents women from testifying
against their batterers. 49 Indeed, as many as one in five victims do
not want their batterer arrested. 50 Even so, battered women
report that abusers exert great control over their everyday
activities. 51 This control manifests itself in rule-making. 52 A
batterer might forbid, for example, his wife from writing checks
from their joint checking account.5 3 A violation of this "rule"
results in a beating.5 4 The wife knows that if she writes the check
in violation of his wishes, she will be punished with physical
violence. As a result, she obeys his rule. A process of selfcensorship develops. 55
The victim, as a woman, has been
socialized to believe that making relationships work is part of her

45. Id.
46. 547 U.S. 813.
47. Id. at 817. Davis determines which statements made in the course of
police interrogations are testimonial. Id. The Court found that statements
are nontestimonial when made "under circumstances objectively indicating
that the primary purpose of the investigation is to enable police assistance to
meet an ongoing emergency." Id. at 822. Statements are testimonial when
there is no "ongoing emergency" and the "primary purpose of the interrogation
is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal
prosecution." Id.
48. DOYLE, supra note 2, at 184.
49. Not all women respond to battering in the same way. See, e.g., Mary
Ann Dutton, Understanding Women's Responses to Domestic Violence: A
Redefinition of Battered Women's Syndrome, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1191, 119496, 1198-1201, 1216-27, 1231-32 (1993) (suggesting that the "psychological
realities of battered women are not limited to one particular 'profile"').
However, the most prevalent dynamics of the battering relationship are
helpful to a discussion of victims' reluctance to testify.
50. Eve S. Buzawa & Carl G. Buzawa, The Scientific Evidence is Not
Conclusive: Arrest is No Panacea, in CURRENT CONTROVERSIES ON FAMILY
VIOLENCE, 337, 348 (R.G. Gelles & D.R. Loseke, eds., 1993).

51. Karla Fischer, Neil Vidmar, & Rene Ellis, The Culture of Battering and
the Role of Mediation in Domestic Violence Cases, 46 SMU L. REV. 2117, 2126
(1993).
52. Id. at 2127.
53. Id. at 2129.
54. Id.
55. Id.
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female role. 56
She feels responsible for the failure of her
relationship with the batterer, evidenced by his "punishment": the
abuse. 57 She learns to censor herself so that the relationship may
58
succeed.
This process of "rule-making" and subsequent censorship
results in the victim's constant fear of future violence. 59 The
batterer maintains control over the victim through the use of
"extensive humiliation, ridicule, criticism ...financial abuse; and
societal isolation." 60 A fear of violence coupled with social isolation
6
prevents women from testifying to the truth of their situation. 1
They are more fearful of the abusive consequences they might
receive from the batterer for unveiling the abuse than they are of
the consequences of keeping the abuse a secret. 62 The victim's
need to self-censor may occur through the complete refusal to
involve the police, a refusal to testify against the abuser in a
criminal proceeding, or the recanting of a prior incident of abuse
63
reported to the police.

56. Id.
57. Id.

58. Id. "Succeed" refers to the woman's misguided belief that if she obeys
the batterer's wishes, the relationship will continue without violence. See, e.g.,
WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN,

infra note 65, at 55-70 (describing the

tension-building phase of the cycle of violence).
59. Fischer, Vidmar, & Ellis, supra note 51, at 2132.

60. Id.
61. See generally Angela Browne, Courtship and Early Marriage: From
to Assault, in WHEN BATTERED WOMEN KILL, 38-48, 52-53
(MacMillan Free Press 1987) (discussing the beginnings of an abusive
relationship). Browne describes isolation as "[n]eed for a constant knowledge
of the woman's whereabouts, combined with a preference for not letting the
woman interact with people other than themselves." Id. at 43. Browne goes
on to say that this led to "severe restrictions of the woman's activities...
especially once a commitment [between the woman and the abuser] had been
established." Id.
62. See Buzawa & Buzawa, supra note 50, at 350 (finding that "[a] woman's
experience may tell her that an arrest is ineffective and violence increases
when the offender is freed").
63. See Borelli, 629 A.2d at 1113 (describing Stark's expert testimony that
battered women stay in a relationship with an abuser, fail to report the abuse,
and deny or minimize the harm they've experienced); see also Fischer, Vidmar,
& Ellis, supra note 51, at 2141 (noticing that battered women feel a great deal
of shame and embarrassment, particularly when their injuries are visible to
others). It is normal for abused women to remain inside their homes until
"their bruises and other injuries fade away." Id. at 1239. Minimization, much
like denial, allows the victim to escape from the pain the violence in her life.
Id. Similarly, in accordance with the cycle of violence, women choose to focus
on the times during the relationship when there was not any violence and
hope that it will not occur again in the future. See infra II.D, note 64 and
accompanying text (describing the manner in which batterers control their
victims and the cycle of violence).

Affection
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D. The Cycle of Violence: 'Waitingfor the fist, waiting for the
smile. "64
Domestic abuse involves a "cycle of violence." 65 Lenore
Walker, one of the first female psychologists to analyze the
dynamics of battering relationships, breaks the cycle of violence
into three phases: the tension-building phase, the acute battering
incident, and the tranquil, loving (non-violent) phase. 66 During
the tension-building phase, minor battering incidents occur and
the woman's main goal is to placate the batterer and keep the
violence from escalating. 67 At some point the tension builds to the
68
point where it erupts in a violent incident.
The acute battering incident is different from the tensionbuilding phase in its intensity. 69 The physical violence and
damage that can occur during this phase leads the victim to
realize that she has no control over the batterer.7 0 Many women
do not seek help during or even directly after an acute battering
incident because they feel like they have lost control over the
relationship.71
Last is the tranquil, loving phase. During this phase, the
batterer seeks forgiveness and the victim may join the batterer in
an illusion of bliss: she convinces herself that it will not happen

64. DOYLE, supra note 2, at 176.
65. LENORE WALKER, The Cycle of Violence, in TERRIFYING LOVE: WHY
BATTERED WOMEN KILL AND How SOCIETY RESPONDS, 42-45 (HarperCollins
1989). See generally LENORE WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN, 55-70 (Harper
& Row 1979) (discussing the phases of the cycle of violence).
66. WALKER, TERRIFYING LOVE, supranote 65, at 42-45.
67. Id. Minor battering incidents include slaps, pinches, verbal abuse, and
psychological warfare. Id. The woman's attempts to calm the batterer range
from "a show of kind, nurturing behavior to simply staying out of his way." Id.
Her desire to placate the batterer is "a double-edged sword" because her
behavior "legitimizes his belief that he had the right to abuse her in the first
place." Id.
68. Id. The psychological tension of the first phase builds to the point
where the woman emotionally withdraws and the batterer, angry at her
withdrawal, becomes more abusive. Id.
69. Id. The acute battering incident is characterized by "rampage, injury,
brutality, and sometimes death."
Id.
The victim sees the incident as
unpredictable, but also knows that it is inevitable. Id. See WALKER, THE
BATTERED WOMAN, supra note 65, at 59-60 ("[L]ack of control and its major
destructiveness distinguish the acute battering incident from the minor
battering incidents in phase one."). Id. at 59.
70. Id. Resistance will only make the attack worse for the victim. Id.
Often, during the attack itself, the victim distances herself from the pain and
does not recognize what is happening. Id.
71. Id.; see also MILLS, supra note 15, at 60 (suggesting that the 'leaving
and staying" of victims in abusive relationships reflects not indecision, but a
complex set of "factors"). Women tend to have stronger relational bonds than
men, and, as a result, are more likely to remain in dangerous abusive
relationships. Id.

20081

Domestic Violence Victim Testimony After Davis

again.

72

III. ANALYSIS
A.

"Too Scared to Expect It".A Typical Domestic Violence Case73

A typical domestic violence prosecution often involves
multiple uses of hearsay and hearsay exceptions.7 4
The
perpetrator's identity, his actions, and the victim's injuries may all
be obtained from the victim's phone call to 911, her statements to
police, photographs of her injuries, and other physical evidence. 75
An entire case may be composed of hearsay evidence. 76 Because
domestic violence often involves repeat offenders, perpetrators and
victims are increasingly aware of law enforcement's use of
77
hearsay.
In some cases, this creates a "race" to call 911 by which the
perpetrator places the call first and actually secures the arrest of
the victim, knowing his call will be used as evidence at trial. 78
72. MILLS, supra note 15, at 60. Many battered women feel responsible for
their abuser; they envision themselves as the one link their batterer has to the
"normal world."
Id. This is the phase where the woman is most
psychologically victimized. Id. 'Ujnderneath the grim cycle of tension,
violence, and forgiveness that make their love truly terrifying each partner
may believe that death is preferable to separation. Neither one may truly feel
that he or she is an independent individual, capable of functioning without the
other." WALKER, TERRIFYING LOVE, supra note 65, at 42-45. See also Michelle
Weldon, I CLOSED MY EYES: REVELATIONS OF A BATTERED WOMAN 118

(Hazelden 1999) (detailing one woman's reflections on her abusive
relationship).
For our entire relationship I had been recklessly positive and forgiving,
seeking solutions, trying to work around him, trying to offer better
answers .... But even looking at him couldn't change who he really
was. He was the only component in my life that I couldn't make better,
that I couldn't change.
Id.
73. DOYLE, supra note 2, at 196.
74. See Alistair Y. Raymond, Case Note, Calling Crawford: Minnesota
Declares a 911 Call Non-Testimonial in State v. Wright, 58 ME. L. REV. 249,
252-53 (explaining the role of hearsay in criminal prosecutions).
75. Id. at 263.
In light of public awareness of domestic violence,
uncooperative victims still make these crimes "among the most difficult to
prosecute" with hearsay evidence as a necessity. Id. In cases of domestic
violence, prosecutors turn to the hearsay exceptions present sense impression,
excited utterance (to admit the victim's 911 calls or statements to police), or
statements for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment (to establish the
victim's injuries). FED. R. EVID. 803(1)(2)(4).

76. Raymond, supra note 74 at 263-64.
77. Id.
78. Id.; see also Richard D. Friedman & Bridget McCormack, Dial-In
Testimony, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1171, 1196-97 (2002)(describing the race to the
phone phenomenon).
The person first to call and complain is more likely to get to stay home,
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This results in recurring and alternating arrests of batterer and
victim to the point where the identity of the real victim becomes
unclear. 79 Problems like this "race" demonstrate the way in which
batterers can manipulate the criminal justice system to their own
advantage.80
The antidote to these practices was once found in evidencebased prosecutions, a technique which Crawford and Davis have
subsequently limited.8 1 This section will examine Crawford and
Davis in depth and the ways in which their fact-specific results
work to the detriment of domestic violence prosecutions.
B. "He'd shot her so she couldn't say anything" The Trap of
82
Unavailability
Hearsay policy stands for the proposition that a witness's outof-court statements are less reliable than statements made by a
witness in court, under oath, in the presence of a jury, and subject
to cross-examination.83 The purpose of any trial is to expose the
truth, and cross-examination is the vehicle by which weaknesses
4
in a witness's testimony are exposed to the factfinder8
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, although
often coupled with hearsay principles, has its own underlying
policies.8 5 The Confrontation Clause "is based upon a fundamental

while the other person is the one charged and taken into custody ....
[I]t reflects merely a race to the phone by abusers who have been
through the system and know that they will be in a much better position
if they are the first to call; batterers, skilled at controlling their victims,
are also likely to manipulate the law enforcement and evidence
gathering system to which 911 is the threshold.
Id.
79. Friedman & McCormack, supra note 78 at 1196-97.
80. Id.
81. See discussion supra Part II.B (emphasizing the importance of evidencebased prosecutions in punishing domestic violence offenders).
82. DOYLE, supra note 2, at 158.
83. Id. at 251-52. The fact that the in-court witness/declarant (as opposed
to the out-of-court declarant) is under oath has been equated to a ceremonial
and religious symbol: it "induces a special obligation [on the part of the
witness] to speak the truth." Carl C. Wheaton, What is Hearsay? 46 IOWA L.
REV. 210, 219-22 (1961). Additionally, the lack of opportunity to observe the
in-court witness/declarant's demeanor has been advanced to justify the
hearsay rule.
Id.
If the jury or factfinder cannot observe the
witness/declarant, they cannot assess his credibility. Id. Another argument
for the hearsay rule is based on the Confrontation Clause. Id. However,
confrontation may be waived if the defendant had a prior opportunity to crossexamine the out-of-court declarant. Id. Therefore, "most writers, both judicial
and nonjudicial, feel that ...lack of opportunity for cross-examination is the
basic reason for rejecting hearsay." Id.
84. See Raymond, supra note 74, at 251-53 (describing the policies behind
the hearsay rule).
85. See id. at 253-56 (providing a brief history of the Confrontation Clause);
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principle.., that a witness's testimony should be given in front of
the adverse party."8 6 The original intent behind the Confrontation
Clause was to prevent the use of depositions or ex parte affidavits
in lieu of cross-examination.8 7 Such practices denied the jury the
opportunity to assess the credibility and believability of the
88
witnesses against the accused.
9
The Court in Roberts merged the Confrontation Clause with
hearsay rules. 90 Statements bore sufficient "indicia of reliability"
under the first prong of the Roberts test if they fell within a "firmly
rooted hearsay exception." 91 The theory was that if an out-of-court
statement fell within a hearsay exception, then there was no need
for cross-examination. 92 Crawford overruled Roberts and re-drew
the line between confrontation and hearsay rules. 93
Under
see also Kenneth Graham, Commentary, Confrontation Stories: Raleigh on the
Mayflower, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM.L. 209, 209-11 (2005) (critiquing the history of
the Confrontation Clause as provided by Justice Scalia in the Crawford
majority opinion).
86. Raymond, supra note 74, at 253.
The conventional history of the right of Confrontation, as embraced by
the Crawford majority, goes something like this: the right of
confrontation was created by common law judges seeking to preserve the
English tradition of liberty in cases of Tudor oppression of the
aristocracy; our ancestors brought this common law right with them
when they came to the New World and deployed it against imperial
persecution in inquisitorial courts. When drafting the Bill of Rights,
James Madison wrote this common law right to cross-examine witnesses
into the Sixth Amendment as a separate right of 'confrontation.'
Graham, supra note 85, at 209.
87. Raymond, supra note 74, at 253. The most famous example of a trial by
ex parte examination is the trial of Sir Walter Raleigh where Raleigh prayed
the court to bring him face to face with his accusers. Graham, supra note 85,
at 212.
88. See Raymond, supra note 74, at 254 (finding that the primary purpose
of the Confrontation Clause is that the witnesses against the accused are
assessed by the jury in the same way the accused is judged); see also Mattox v.
United States, 156 U.S. 237, 240 (1895) (Mattox is one of the first cases to deal
with the right of confrontation and held that the defendant [a murderer]
should not go free simply because "death has closed the mouth of that
witness"). Although standing for the proposition that the defendant must
stand in court and face his accuser, Mattox also paved the way for the
Confrontation Clause to yield to public policy and the necessities of the case.
Id.
89. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
90. See Raymond, supra note 74, at 255-56 (finding that Roberts merged,
and Crawford later severed the Confrontation Clause from hearsay).
91. Id. at 255. The Roberts Court noted that competing interests may
sometimes warrant dispensing with the confrontation requirements. Id. The
adequate "indicia of reliability" test demanded that not only must the hearsay
statements be necessary, they must either 1) fall within a firmly rooted
hearsay exception, or 2) show "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness."
Id.; Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65-66.
92. Raymond, supra note 74, at 255.
93. Crawford, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
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Crawford, out-of-court statements must independently satisfy both
a hearsay exception and the demands of the Confrontation
94
Clause.
C. "Memoriesare made of this" Pre- and Post-Crawford
HistoricalPerspectives95
In theory, Justice Scalia's majority opinion in Crawford uses
history to rejuvenate the defendant's right to confrontation. 96 In
practice, his opinion delivers a blow to domestic violence
prosecutions. 97 The Crawford rule insists on cross-examination as
the only tool sufficient to satisfy the Confrontation Clause of the
Sixth Amendment. 98 As a result, if an out-of-court statement is
deemed testimonial in nature, and the witness is not available to
testify at trial, the defendant must have had a prior opportunity
for cross-examination. 99
The Court defines testimony as "a solemn declaration or
affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some
fact." 100 Testimonial statements, then, consist of "affidavits...
prior testimony that the defendant was unable to cross-examine,
or similar pretrial statements that an out-of-court declarant would
Under the
reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially." 10 1
Crawford formulation, statements taken by police officers are
testimonial under the narrowest standard because they resemble
the English examinations the Confrontation Clause sought to
eliminate. 102 The Crawford Court declined the opportunity to
94. See id. at 65-66 (rejecting and overruling Roberts).
95. DOYLE, supranote 2, at 198.
96. See Raymond, supra note 74, at 256-61 (describing Crawford's effect as
a "complete paradigm shift" in the Supreme Court's view of the Confrontation
Clause).
97. See Adam M. Krischer, Though Justice May Be Blind, It Is Not Stupid,
Prosecutor, Nov. - Dec. 2004, at 14 (applying "common sense" and damage
control to prosecutors' interpretations of Crawford).
98. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 65. In Crawford, the defendant, Michael
Crawford, was charged with assault and attempted murder. Id. at 40. At
trial, the prosecutor attempted to introduce evidence of Sylvia Crawford's outof-court statement to police as evidence that Michael's attack on the victim
was not self-defense. Id. Sylvia did not testify at trial because she asserted
Washington's marital privilege. Id. The trial court allowed Sylvia's statement
under the Roberts standard and the Washington Supreme Court agreed,
finding her statement to be reliable. Id. at 40-42. The Supreme Court
reversed the trial court decision. Id. at 68-69.
99. Id. at 59. "The Clause does not bar admission of a statement so long as
the declarant is present at trial to defend or explain it. (The Clause also does
not bar the use of testimonial statements for purposes other than proving the
truth of the matter asserted)." Id.
100. Id. at 51.
101. Id. at 52.
102. Id. See Robert P. Mosteller, Crawford v. Washington:L Encouragingand
Ensuring the Confrontationof Witness, 39 U. RICH. L. REV. 511, 547-55 (2005)
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"spell out a comprehensive definition of testimonial."' 10 3
In the wake of Crawford, prosecuting domestic violence cases
became even more difficult. 104 Statements to law enforcement
officers, once admitted in the victim's absence if deemed reliable
under the Roberts standard, were refused. 10 5 The use of taped 911
calls from victims also became problematic because although many
calls were requests for immediate police intervention, some had
0
"testimonial" qualities.1 s
Post-Crawford,many scholars suggested that the doctrine of
forfeiture by wrongdoing could circumvent the Crawford problem
in domestic violence cases. 10 7 However, even where the defendant
has threatened or even re-assaulted the victim to prevent her from
08
testifying, establishing wrongdoing is nearly impossible.
"Victims who fear participating in a prosecution are unlikely to
inform prosecutors about new episodes of abuse and even less
likely to appear for a forfeiture hearing. Thus, where proof of the
("seeking a categorical solution" to the treatment of police interrogations as
testimony). But see Graham, supra note 85, at 219 (finding that the right of
confrontation is an American innovation, not an English importation and to
"confront" and accuser meant the holistic right to a fair trial, not just the right
to cross-examination).
103. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68. Scalia recognizes that the court's refusal to
articulate a comprehensive definition will cause interim uncertainty, but
stated "it can hardly be worse than the status quo [under Roberts]." Id.; see
Mosteller, supra note 102, at 532-47 (providing case examples of testimonial
and nontestimonial statements).
104. Krischer, supra note 97, at 14.
105. See generally Sweta Patel, Comment: The Right to Submit 'Testimony'
Via 911 Emergency after Crawford v. Washington, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REV.

707, 714 (analyzing which statements may be testimonial under the Crawford
Confrontation Clause formulation). See also Malhotra, supra note 29, at 221
(finding that 911 calls are not per se testimonial).
106. Raymond, supra note 74, at 264. See also Mosteller, supra note 102, at
608 (describing Crawfords destructive effect on domestic violence
prosecutions); David Jaros, Essay: The Lessons of People v. Moscat:
ConfrontingJudicialBias in Domestic Violence Cases InterpretingCrawford v.
Washington, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 995, 995-98 (2005) (describing the confusion
that followed Crawford and its interpretation); Brief for the National Network
to End Domestic Violence Indiana and Washington Coalitions Against
Domestic Violence, Legal Momentum, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondents, Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006) (Nos. 05-5224, 055705) 2006 WL 284229.
[6]3% of respondents reported that the Crawford decision significantly
impeded prosecutions of domestic violence; 76% indicated that after
Crawford, their offices were more likely to drop domestic violence
charges when victims recant or refuse to cooperate; and 65% reported
that victims of domestic violence are now less safe in their jurisdictions
than during the era preceding the Crawford decision.
Id. at 17.
107. See, e.g., Krischer, supra note 97, at 14 (suggesting that forfeiture is a
long-term solution to the Crawford problem).
108. Brief as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, supra note 106, at 23.
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defendant's wrongdoing depends solely on the victim's in-court
testimony, the testimony will be unavailable and a forfeiture
argument will fail."'109
D. Testimonial v. Nontestimonial Statements: "I had
to say something definite, I had to let him know." 110
Davis v. Washington was the Court's opportunity to define
testimonial statements in domestic violence cases."'
On
certiorari, the Court combined the cases of Davis v. Washington
112
and Hammon v. Indiana in its decision.
In Davis, Michelle McCottry called 911." 13 The conversation
revealed that McCottry had just been assaulted by Davis, her
4
former boyfriend, who had come to her house to "get his stuff.""1
The operator explained that the police would first check the area
for Davis, then find Michelle and speak with her.' 15 When the
police arrived within four minutes of the 911 call, they observed
Michelle McCottry in a "frantic" state. 116 She had "fresh injuries
on her forearm and face" and she was "gather[ing] her belongings
17
and her children so they could leave the residence." 1
Adrian Davis was charged with felony violation of a domestic
no-contact order and at trial, the State's only witnesses were the
police officers who responded to Michelle's 911 call."18 Although
Michelle initially cooperated with the prosecutor's office, the State
was unable to locate her at the time of trial."19 The trial court
109. Id. at 22-23. 'Moreover, proof of interference in the domestic violence
context can be quite subtle. 'Battered women... may perceive danger and
imminence differently from men ....

A subtle gesture or a new method of

abuse, insignificant to another person, may create a reasonable fear in a
battered woman."' People v. Romero, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d 332, 338 (Cal. Ct. App.
1992).
110. DOYLE, supranote 2, at 173.
111. 547 U.S. 813.
112. State v. Davis, 154 Wash. 2d 291 (Wash. 2005); Hammon v. State, 829
N.E.2d 444 (Ind. 2005).
113. Davis, 547 U.S. at 817. When the operator answered, the connection
terminated before anyone spoke and the operator reversed the call. Id.
114. Id. at 817-18. The relevant portion of the call was as follows:
Complainant: Hello.
911 Operator: What's going on?
Complainant: He's here jumpin' on me again...
911 Operator: Are there any weapons?

Complainant: No. He's usin' his fists...
911 Operator: Listen to me carefully. Do you know his last name?
Complainant: It's Davis.

Id.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Davis, 154 Wash. 2d at 296.
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admitted the 911 call as an excited utterance hearsay exception
over Davis's Confrontation Clause objections. 120
Davis was
121
convicted.
In Hammon, police responded to reports of a domestic
disturbance at the home of Hershel and Amy Hammon. 122 When
they arrived, they found Amy Hammon "alone on the front porch,"
"somewhat frightened."1 23 She told police that "nothing was the
matter" and gave them permission to enter her house. 124 Once
inside, police observed a broken heating unit with shards of glass
strewn around the still-lit unit. 121 Hershel admitted to police that
he and Amy had been in an argument, but said that it never
became physical and "everything was fine now." 126 One of the
officers remained with Hershel while the other went to the living
room to ask Amy again what had happened.1 27 Hershel tried to
intervene in Amy's conversation with the police and became angry
when police forced him to stay separated from his wife.1 28 Amy
129
filled out a battery affidavit.
Hershel was charged with domestic battery in violation of his
probation.1 30 Although the state subpoenaed Amy, she did not
appear at Hershel's bench trial.3l The trial court admitted Amy's
affidavit as a present sense impression, and her statements to
police officers as excited utterances, both exceptions to the hearsay
rule. 13 2 Hershel Hammon was found guilty and the Indiana
133
Supreme Court affirmed his conviction.

120. Id.; see also FED. R. EVID. 803(1). The Washington Supreme Court
affirmed, "concluding that the portion of the 911 conversation in which
McCottry identified Davis was not testimonial, and that if other portions of
the conversation were testimonial, admitting them was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt." Davis, 547 U.S. at 817.
121. Id.
122. Hammon, 829 N.E.2d at 446.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 447.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Davis, 547 U.S. at 819-20.
129. Id. The pertinent part of the affidavit stated: "Broke our Furnace &
shoved me down on the floor into the broken glass. Hit me in the chest and
threw me down. Broke our lamps & phone .... " Id.
130. Hammon, 829 N.E.2d at 447.
131. Id.
132. Davis, 547 U.S. at 820; FED. R. EVID. 803 (1) & (2).
133. Id. The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, validated the
admission of Amy's statements to police as excited utterances and found that
even though the battery affidavit was testimonial, it was harmless beyond
reasonable doubt. Id.
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Questioningthe Clarity of An Ongoing Emergency:
34
"Hissmile meant lots of things. '1

In its opinion, the Court referred to the Crawford
formulations of testimonial statements. 135 The police interrogation
in Crawford qualified under any definition of testimonial, but the
statements in Davis could not be characterized so easily. 136 Davis
took Crawford's testimoniallnontestimonial distinction to the next
level by characterizing nontestimonial statements as those
statements "made in the course of police interrogation under
circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of
the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing
emergency."' 37 Statements are testimonial when there is no
"ongoing emergency, and... the primary purpose of the
interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially
1 38
relevant to later criminal prosecution."
With regard to Michelle McCottry's 911 call, the Davis Court
found that her out-of-court statements were nontestimonial
because she was facing an ongoing emergency. 39 "McCottry's
frantic answers were provided over the phone, in an environment
that was not tranquil, or even (as far as any reasonable 911
operator could make out) safe."'140 Because McCottry was in fear
for her life and in need of police assistance, the primary purpose of
4
her call was not to provide testimony.' '
Unlike Michelle McCottry's 911 call, the Court deemed Amy
Hammon's statements to police officers testimonial. 142 Indeed, the
143
to
Court likens the police investigation in Amy Hammon's case

134. DOYLE, supra note 2, at 196.
135. Davis, 547 U.S. at 822.

136. Id.
137. Id.

138. Id.
139. Id. at 827. "Although one might call 911 to provide a narrative report of
a crime absent any imminent danger, McCottry's call was plainly a call for
help against a bona fide physical threat." Id.
140. Id.; see also State v. Wright, 726 N.W.2d 464, 475 (Minn. 2007)
(holding, in light of Davis, that both the initial portion of a 911 call reporting
an emergency, and the later portion where caller asked for assurances that
But see People v. Cortes, 781
help was coming, were non-testimonial).
N.Y.S.2d 401, 407 (App. Div. 2004) (holding that a 911 call from a witness to a
crime is testimonial because individuals call 911 to report crimes with the
knowledge that they, the perpetrator, will be prosecuted).
141. 547 U.S. at 828. Just because this portion of McCottry's call was
nontestimonial, does not mean that the call could not have evolved into
testimonial statements once the call's purpose of securing emergency
assistance was achieved. Id.
142. Id. at 830.
143. Hammon, 829 N.E.2d at 446-48.
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the investigation of Sylvia Crawford. 144 Because Amy Hammon
was not facing an ongoing emergency, the statements she made to
police were testimonial in nature and her absence in court violated
the Confrontation Clause.145
By having Amy sign a battery
affidavit and answer questions about what happened (not what is
happening), the officers investigated possible past criminal
conduct. 148
The Supreme Court reversed Hershel Hammon's
47
conviction.
In its opinion, the Supreme Court never addresses the
domestic violence context in which both of these cases arose. In
fact, the Court only refers to the character of the offenses, crimes
of "domestic violence," once in its opinion. 148 Ironically, however,
the Court, as it did in Crawford, engages in a lengthy discussion
about the historical meaning of the words "witness" and
"testimonial" and the meaning of the Confrontation Clause as it
9
was understood during the Framer's generation.14
F.

Ongoing Emergencies in the Domestic Violence Context:
150
"Everythingwas fragile and hysterically important"

Justice Thomas, dissenting in Davis, criticized the
testimonial/nontestimonial distinction as being "neither workable
nor a targeted attempt to reach the abuses forbidden by the
[Confrontation] Clause." 151
Thomas points out that a law
enforcement officer always responds to a crime scene with the dual
purposes of assessing the emergency in progress and preparing for
a later criminal prosecution.152
The Davis distinction requires that courts divine the purpose
151
It
of any police investigation producing out-of-court statements.

144. Davis, 547 U.S. at 829-32. Although the Crawford interrogation was
admittedly more formal, the primary purpose was the same in both cases: to
provide the truth about past criminal conduct. Id. Sylvia Crawford was
interrogated at the police station separately from her husband Michael
Crawford; Amy Hammon was interviewed in the living room while Hershel
Hammon was secured to the kitchen. Id. Both took place after the events in
question were over and both attempted to re-create those events. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 834.
148. Id. at 831.
149. Id. at 821-22.
150. DOYLE, supra note 2, at 196.
151. Davis, 547 U.S. at 842 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment in part and
dissenting in part); see also Brief as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents,
supra note 106, at 29 (arguing that prosecutorial abuse and trial by affidavit is
not a concern in domestic violence cases because the state has historically
ignored domestic violence cases).
152. Davis, 547 U.S. at 839-41.
153. Id.; see also Mosteller, supra note 102, at 553-54 (recognizing difficulty
with police interrogations deemed testimonial per se because an officer may
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is impossible to know whether, once police left Amy Hammon's
house, Hershel's violence would have resumed and escalated. 54 In
this instance, what the Court characterized as "past conduct"
155
transforms into an ongoing emergency.
The standards Davis announced force courts to decide the
admissibility of out-of-court statements on a case-by-case, factspecific basis. 156 Although 911 calls may be less offensive to the
Confrontation Clause, they too may contain testimonial elements
157
that must be redacted before they can be offered into evidence.
The question becomes, if an ongoing emergency is the standard,
how does one really know that Michelle McCottry was in a worse
position than Amy Hammon? 158 The facts show that Amy was still
married to her abuser and, more significantly, she resided with
him. 159 Intuitively, Amy was more likely to suffer another incident
160
of abuse.
What constitutes "an ongoing emergency" for the Davis Court
is very different from what constitutes an ongoing emergency for a
domestic violence victim. What the Court defines as "an ongoing
emergency" is really an ongoing occurrence. But given the cyclical
nature of domestic violence, victims are in a constant state of
emergency.' 6' In fact, the next acute battering incident may occur
at any time. 62 Add to this the fact that many batterers use the
nontestimonial nature of 911 calls to their advantage and benefit

not recognize the significance of a statement at the time it is made); Ariana J.
Torchin, Note, A Multidimensional Framework for the Analysis of Testimonial
Hearsay Under Crawford v. Washington, 94 GEO. L. J. 581, 593 (2006)
(describing the circuit split between courts on whether statements produced
during a preliminary police investigation are testimonial); Hiibel v. Sixth Jud.
Dist. Ct., 542 U.S. 177, 186 (2004) (finding that initial police inquiries in
domestic disputes often produce nontestimonial statements). During domestic
disputes, "officers called to investigate.., need to know whom they are
dealing with in order to assess the situation, the threat to their own safety,
and possible danger to the potential victim." Id.
154. 547 U.S. at 41.
155. Id.
156. See id. at 829-30 (differentiating Hammon from Davis).
157. See id. at 828 (finding that a call originating from the need for
immediate assistance can "evolve into testimonial statements").
158. See id. at 819 (explaining that Amy was "frightened" and there were
"flames coming out of the ... partial glass front of the heater").
159. Id.
160. See id. at 820 (noting that Hershel became angry when police officers
separated him from Amy). The domestic disturbance call was to the home of
Amy and Hershel Hammon. Id. at 819.
161. See supra Part II.D (describing the cycle of violence in abusive
relationships); see also Brief as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, supra
note 106, at 4 (describing domestic abuse as "a pattern of terror, domination
and control").
162. See supra Part III.C (pointing to the problem with relying on the
doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing).
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from the fact that forfeiture by wrongdoing is almost impossible to
prove when the victim is unavailable to testify. 163 To put it into
the words of the Davis Court, for a domestic violence victim, each
and every day is an ongoing emergency.164
III. PROPOSAL
A. The Unintended Consequences of the Davis Decision:
'You get up, you stagger to the doors, the doors shut."165
Domestic violence is unlike any other crime. 166 In part, this is
because both parties-batterer and victim-know how to
manipulate the system. 67 Domestic violence is a cycle, which by
definition implicates the same parties involved in similar
altercations more than once.1 68 This is important to remember
when considering Davis's impact on domestic violence
prosecutions. 169
First, Davis's holding will intensify the race to the phone that
already permeates domestic violence cases. 170 Although Davis did
not declare 911 calls nontestimonial per se, both batterers and
victims can understand that whoever calls 911 first will remain at

163. See supra Part III.A (discussing the "race" to the phone).
164. See 547 U.S. at 822; see also Wisconsin v. Rodriguez, 722 N.W.2d 136,
141 (Wis. Ct. App. 2006) (discussing a post-Davis case where police were

speaking to the victim outside the house while the defendant was hiding
inside under her couch clutching a knife). The Wisconsin Court of Appeals
found that:
Officers Sterling and Kurtz did not go to the LaMoore [victim] house
looking for evidence with which to prosecute Rodriguez [defendant], and,
after they arrived their focus was not on building a case against him
but, rather, trying to ensure the safety of Ms. LaMoore and her
daughter, and other members of the community.
Id. at 148. Here, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals found that, although police
questioned the victim at her home, she was still in the midst of an "ongoing
emergency" under Davis. Id.
165. DOYLE, supra note 2, at 109.
166. See Tom Lininger, ProsecutingBatterers After Crawford, 91 VA. L. REV.
747, 768-71 (2005) (distinguishing domestic violence as problematic due to the
fact that victims recant, are uncooperative with law enforcement, and often do
not show up to court proceedings).
167. See discussion infra Part III.A (discussing batterer and victim
knowledge of the importance of the initial phone call to 911) and Friedman &
McCormack, supra note 78 and accompanying text, at 1196-97 (describing the
phenomenon of "dial-in testimony").
168. See discussion supra Part II.D (describing the cycle of violence).
169. See, e.g., Rodriguez, 722 N.W. at 139.
170. See discussion infra Part III.A (discussing batterer and victim
knowledge of the importance of the initial phone call to 911) and Friedman &
McCormack, supra note 78 and accompanying text, at 1196-97 (describing the
phenomenon of "dial-in testimony").
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home. 171 A transcript of his or her call may be admitted in a
subsequent criminal proceeding where the caller (here, the
"victim") fails to appear. 172 By giving 911 calls a nontestimonial
status, the Court, albeit respecting the Confrontation Clause and
requirements of Crawford, effectuates yet another way for
batterers to control their victims. If the batterer reaches for the
dial first, the true victim may be arrested.
Second, before Crawford and Davis, encouraging a victim to
73
testify against her abuser was already nearly impossible.
Ironically, the Davis distinction between a nontestimonial 911 call
1 74
and a testimonial police interrogation compounds this problem.
If a victim believes that a 911 tape can easily take her place in
court, why would she anger her lover and risk damaging her
relationship by testifying against him? 175 Simply put, she would
76

not.1

The best scenario for the prosecutor is one in which the victim
testifies in open court against her abuser. 177 However, this goal is
unrealistic, especially when the victim has much to lose by
testifying against a man she loves, fears, and with whom she
probably shares a life. 78 If victims know that calling 911 (as
opposed to speaking with police at the scene) relieves them79 of a
painful day in court, then surely they will choose the former.
Third, as Justice Thomas points out in Davis, the Court's
171. See Friedman & McCormack, supra note 78 and accompanying text, at
1196-97 (presenting the reality of batterer knowledge about the domestic
violence prosecution process).
172. See id. at 1195 (finding that with increased awareness of domestic
violence, "[v]ictims are reminded that their complaints will be taken seriously
and that protective and punitive action to assist them will follow...").
173. See Douglas E. Beloof & Joel Shapiro, Let the Truth Be Told: Proposed
Hearsay Exceptions to Admit Domestic Violence Victims' Out of Court
Statements as Substantive Evidence, 11 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1, 1 (2002)
(addressing the problem of victim recantation).
174. See The Supreme Court, 2005 Term Leading Cases, 120 HARV. L. REV.
213, 217 (2006) (analyzing Davis's possible effects, including the "perverse"
incentive for officers to elicit as much information as possible, thus delaying
resolution of the underlying emergency).
175. See id. at 216-21 (describing the problems in the subtext of the Davis
decision).
176. See id. at 217 (requesting that Court create rules to facilitate victim
testimony and ensure that the Davis holding does not further impede such
testimony).
177. Interview with Benjamin Ford, Assistant District Attorney, Nashville
District Attorney's Office, in Nashville, Tenn. (Nov. 13, 2006) (describing the
best case scenario for prosecutors).
178. See Beloof & Shapiro, supra note 174, at 1 (providing reasons why
victims fail to appear in court or recant their accusations).
179. See Brief as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, supra note 106, at
16 (suggesting that "[t]he rights accorded to defendants under the
Confrontation Clause were intended as a 'shield' to protect the defendant from
potential prosecutorial abuses," not as a sword "wielded" against victims).
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decision leaves the door open for police abuse.180
By holding that the Confrontation Clause applies only to a
particular subset of police interrogation techniques, the Court
created the obvious risk that police officers will mold their
techniques to elicit statements defined as nontestimonial ....911
operators, for instance, might be instructed to press callers for
information about their assailants during the emergency rather
181
than guide them to safety ....

Police and emergency personnel perform a dual role in our
society. 8 2 They provide immediate, official assistance in ending a
dangerous situation and they collect information to help with the
investigation and prosecution. 183
These two roles are
interconnected, difficult to separate, and often at odds. 8 4 Under
Davis, police must not ask questions that may produce even a
single testimonial statement. 8 5 Further, they must keep the
victim worked up--"excited"-so that the victim's statements may
come in under an excited utterance exception to hearsay. 186 Not
only are the above practices abuses of police discretion, but they
87
also compromise the victim's physical and emotional safety.
Last, the Davis rule focuses on "the primary purpose of the
interrogation."'' 8 8
However, the Court does not advise whose
89
purpose should be examined: the police officer's or the victim's.
One scholar suggests that because the Crawford rule was designed
to prevent government indiscretions, the Davis ruling refers to the
purpose of the police officer. 190 However, as seen in Crawford, the
180. Davis, 541 U.S. at 834 (Thomas, J., concurring). "Today, a mere two
years after the Court decided Crawford, it adopts an equally unpredictable

test, under which district courts are charged with divining the 'primary
purpose' of police interrogations." Id.
181.
182.
183.
184.

Leading Cases, supra note 175, at 217.
Malhotra, supra note 29, at 217.
Id.
See Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 190-91 (holding that preliminary determinations

made at the scene of domestic violence incidents are nontestimonial in nature,
but can convert to a form of testimonial questioning).
185. See Leading Cases, supra note 175, at 217 (describing possible police

abuses under the Davis framework designed to elicit statements defined as
nontestimonial).
186. See FED. R. EVID. 803(2); see also Leading Cases, supra note 175, at 217
(outlining the potential for police abuse of the excited utterance exception by
prolonging a startling event).
187. See Leading Cases, supra note 175, at 217 (noting the problem with

allowing police officers to tailor their questioning of domestic violence victims
in an effort to avoid producing testimonial statements).
188. Davis, 547 U.S. at 822.
189. Id.; see also Leading Cases, supra note 175, at 218 (pointing out that the

Court leaves open the "crucial question" of whose purpose is important in the
Davis analysis). The article observes, "[a] purpose cannot merely exist;
someone must have one." Id.
190. See Leading Cases, supra note 175, at 219. (finding the Court's
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testimonial formulation addresses "pretrial statements that out-ofcourt declarants would reasonably expect to be used
prosecutorially."' 191 Further, in Davis, Justice Scalia notes that
"any reasonable listener' would recognize the fact that Michelle
McCottry "was facing an ongoing emergency."' 92
Both
interpretations of primary purpose of the interrogation, from the
viewpoint of the police officer or the victim, are plausible, leaving
3
the ambiguity unresolved. 19
B. The Cultureof Victimhood in Davis's Context: "I
194
know the paths and the bumps. I know what goes on."
Suppose that Davis's "primary purpose" refers to the victim's
state of mind when obtaining assistance from law enforcement
officers. 195 Taking into account the psychological aspects of
domestic violence, a domestic violence victim's out-of-court
statement to emergency personnel or police officers would likely
6
not be made in anticipation of criminal prosecution.19
Victims of domestic violence are more likely to recant
statements made to police or refuse to cooperate than any other
crime victim. 197 Eighty to eighty-five percent of battered women
will recant at least once during each criminal case. 198 Moreover,
even if victims cooperate with the police initially, fear of the effects
on their relationship with the batterer, concern about loss of
economic resources, custody of their children, or the fear of more
violence will weigh heavily on the victim within a matter of
days. 199
interpretation of the rule focused on the perspective of the police officer,
because that interpretation best addresses both semantic and policy concerns).
191. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51 (quoting White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 365
(1992)).
192. Davis, 547 U.S. at 827.
193. See id. at 830 (finding that with regard to Hershel Hammon, Scalia uses
the phrase "he was not seeking" (meaning the officer) and with regard to
Michelle McCottry, Scalia says "any reasonable listener" would recognize that
"she" (meaning McCottry) "was facing an ongoing emergency").
194. DOYLE, supranote 2, at 110.
195. See Leading Cases, supra note 175, at 218-19 (noting Justice Scalia's
discussion of both the victim's and the officer's state of mind in Davis).
196. Davis, 547 U.S. at 828.
197. Lininger, supra note 167, at 768.
198. Id.
199. Id. "In a recent case, after the prosecution won a conviction by proving
that the defendant had tied up his girlfriend and beaten her repeatedly, the
victim actually testified for the defendant at the sentencing hearing, claiming
that he was a 'perfect provider'." Id. at 770 (citing People v. Thompson, 812
N.E.2d 516, 520 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004)). "Other factors that may lead victims to
recant or refuse to cooperate include continued emotional attachment to
batterers, reluctance to break up families, religious and cultural views of
relationships... 'learned helplessness' based on repeated abuse, and a
genuine belief that no crime has occurred." Id.
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Further, the cyclical nature of domestic violence necessitates
the victim's reconciliation with her batterer. 200 Truly, because the
victim convinces herself that the violence will not happen again,
she will never have one eye toward prosecution. 2 1 Victims call
911 in order to receive temporary relief from the situation, but
absent an immediate threat of an acute battering incident, victims
will not risk testifying and breaking their batterer's rules.

20 2

C. Domestic Violence Through a Feminist Lens: "There were days
when I didn't exist; he saw through me and walked around me" 20 3
The batterer-victim relationship can be viewed as a
microcosm of a larger power struggle at work within the criminal
justice system. From a feminist perspective, domestic violence is
one area that reveals the imbalance of power between men and
women in American society. 20 4 Looking broadly at the nature of
criminal and evidentiary laws (and considering that men were the
architects of most of these laws), the legal standards that govern
crimes against women are undeniably masculine.
For example, evidentiary rules in rape cases often reflect
male, not female, notions of consent and self-defense. 20 5 In effect,
many incidents considered rape by a reasonable woman are
overlooked as normal by a system that recognizes and accepts
20 6
coercive male sexual behavior.
As a further illustration, in the context of domestic violence
200. See WALKER, TERRIFYING LOVE, supra note 65, at 42-45 (laying out the

stages of a battering relationship).
201. See MILLS, supra note 15, at 60. See also supra note 72 and
accompanying text (discussing the way in which victims feel responsible for
leaving or betraying the trust of their abuser); see also WELDON, supra note
72, at 127 (detailing the author's anxiety before obtaining an emergency order
of protection against her husband/batterer). "For three nights before I went to
domestic violence court, he slept in our house, eating dinner in the kitchen...
• I couldn't hear him[;] ... [it was] [a]s if I were deaf." Id.
202. See WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN, supra note 65 at 59-60
(discussing the "acute battering incident" stage of domestic violence
relationship); see also supra notes 66-71 and accompanying text (providing a
timeline for the cycle of domestic abuse).
203. DOYLE, supra note 2, at 178.
204. See Katharine T. Bartlett, Essay: Gender Law, 1 DUKE J. GENDER L. &
POLY, 1, 6 (1994) (setting forth the feminist legal theory of nonsubordination
or dominance, whereby a rule, practice, or social construct operates to further
the subordination of women).
205. Id. at 9; see also Kit Kinports, Special Issue: Feminism and the
Criminal Law, Rape and Force: The Forgotten Mens Rea, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L.
REV. 755, 791-92 (2001) (finding irony in the fact that the injury of rape stems
from the meaning of the unwanted act to its female victim, while the criminal
standard is composed of the meaning of the act to the male assailant); Patricia
Hughes, From a Woman's Point of View, 42 U. NEW BRUNSWICK L. J. 341, 343
(1993) (criticizing the defining of rape from a strictly male point of view).
206. Kinports, supra note 206, at 790-91.
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homicide, the law attempts to affix male responses to a mostly
female problem. Because men generally react immediately to
provocation, facts that allow for a small "cooling off period"
between the domestic violence (characterized as provocation) and a
female response are admitted as relevant. 2 7 Meanwhile, evidence
of the infliction of years of physical and mental abuse on a woman
before she responds is excluded as irrelevant. 208 In this vein,
Battered Women's Syndrome has never been accepted as a defense
to homicide, while acting in self-defense is an acceptable response
to provocation. 20 9 In response, feminist legal scholars argue that
self-defense should be rethought to consider "why abused women
who strike back at their abusers may stay with their batterers
well beyond the point of conventional 'reason,' and why they may
act to protect themselves at a time when they do not appear to be
immediately threatened." 210 Where laws are based solely on
masculine standards, the criminal justice system is inherently
unequal.
Specifically in the evidentiary context, it is often argued that
211
the hearsay rule is one of universal and equal application.
However, as feminist scholar Catherine MacKinnon points out,
"[w]hen it [the law] is most ruthlessly neutral, it is most male;
when it is most sex blind, it is most blind to the sex of the
standard being applied."212 The hearsay rule presupposes that
excluding less reliable communications will affect men and women
equally. But, as research and experience suggests, men and
2 13
women communicate differently.
In her selection, Gender Bias in the Hearsay Rule, Fiona
Raitt, a feminist scholar focusing on evidence, argues that the
hearsay rule works against women's interests by virtue of the
different communication patterns between men and women, and
214
the language of professional discourse used in the courtroom.
Hearsay law, as it has developed in our legal system, ignores the
207. DEBORAH L. RHODE & KATHARINE

T.

BARTLETT, GENDER AND LAW:

THEORY, DOCTRINE, COMMENTARY 516 n.1 (4th ed. 2006).

208. Id. at 521 n.3.
209. See, e.g., State v. Norman, 378 S.E.2d 8 (N.C. 1989) (declining to expand
self-defense beyond "the limits of immediacy and necessity"). "It has even
been suggested that the relaxed requirements of self-defense found in what is
often called 'the battered woman's defense' could be extended in principle to
any type of case in which a defendant testified that he or she subjectively
believed that killing was necessary and proportionate to any perceived
threat...." Id. at 16.
210. Bartlett, supra note 205, at 9 n.38.
211. Fiona E. Raitt, Gender Bias in the Hearsay Rule, FEMINIST
PERSPECTIVES ON EVIDENCE 59, 63 (Mary Childs & Louise Ellison eds., 2000).
212.

Catherine MacKinnon, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE, 1,

248 n.3 (Harvard Univ. Press 1989).
213. Raitt, supra note 212, at 63.
214. Id.
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importance that women accord their conversations with others.
These conversations often take place on a face-to-face basis and
individuals are carefully selected to receive the shared
information. 2 5 However, because this information is viewed by
the law as "second-hand," its potential significance is completely
disregarded. Further, as has often been the case in rape and
domestic violence cases alike, the rigid language of lawyers is at
odds with patterns of female communication that values intimacy
and context. 216 Successful advocacy demands that the lawyer
"control" the witness and act "dominant," especially during crossexamination, in order to be the victor in the American adversarial
217
system.
Exposing the dominance and recognizing the uphill battle
that domestic violence prosecutions face is an important first step.
However, until laws are made with female experience in mind,
proactive steps must be taken to address the reality of domestic
violence cases.
D. The Failureof Davis for Domestic Violence Victims: "That was
the blackest time, the five minutes after I felt the cold and
recognized it. ,218
Domestic violence prosecutions cannot be treated like other
220
criminal prosecutions. 219 Victims recant, refuse to cooperate; lie.
As a result, prosecutors must rely on hearsay statements,
photographs, and the testimony of others to arrive at "the
truth."221 Add to the equation the fact that domestic violence was
222
not even recognized as a crime until just thirty years ago.
Despite these considerations, Justice Scalia used an
interpretation of the history of the Confrontation Clause, not a
realistic look at the criminal justice system as applied to domestic
violence cases, to reach the Crawford and Davis decisions. 223 His
historical formulation leads to this result: confrontation demands

215. Id. at 63, 65.
216. Id. at 68.
217. Id. at 69-70.
218. DOYLE,supra note 2, at 110.
219. See Raymond, supra note 74, at 263-64 (detailing the role of hearsay in
victimless prosecution for domestic violence).
220. See id. (characterizing the difficulty that domestic violence victims pose
to the criminal court process).
221. See id. (discussing the nature of victimless prosecutions).
222. See Dekki, supra note 5, at 553; Jeanne Suk, Criminal Law Comes
Home, 116 YALE L.J. 2, 12-13 (2006) (describing the history associated with
domestic violence). Historically, wife beating was even "overtly approved and
reserved as a right of the man of the house" as a form of chastisement. Id.
223. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 42-52; see also supra note 86 and accompanying
text (providing a summary of Justice Scalia's Crawford Confrontation Clause

history).
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nothing less than cross-examination any time a testimonial out-ofcourt statement is offered for the truth of the matter asserted,
regardless of the charge against the defendant or the criminal
context. 224 Yet "the English common law has never recognized a
right to Confrontation." 225 Further, the Founders viewed the Sixth
Amendment "holistically" in that they did not see it as demanding
merely confrontation, but the more general and expansive right to
a fair trial. 226 In what could be seen as Davis's greatest failure,
the Court never acknowledges that Michelle McCottry and Amy
Hammon are victims of intimate violence. The Court refuses to
consider the distinct nature of domestic violence crimes and, in
doing so, places two equally endangered victims in very different
legal positions.
A single interpretation of Confrontation Clause history cannot
be used to demand confrontation in all cases. 227 In cases of
domestic violence, the mere presence of the defendant in the
courtroom puts the victim in a state of severe emotional
distress. 228 One victim describes her reaction to confronting her
abuser: "it still makes me throw-up when I have to face him. I
break out in a horrible, drenching cold sweat.... I often have to
seek medical attention afterwards for migraines." 229 In most
cases, confrontation and cross-examination is perhaps the most
efficient way to reach the truth. 230 However, where placing the
victim on the stand is emotionally and physically damaging, it is
231
not the best method, nor is it the only method.

224. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61-62 (interpreting what the Framers would
have wanted with regard to testimonial statements).
225. Graham, supra note 85, at 209.
226. Id. at 210; see also Brief as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents,
supra note 106, at 28-29 (arguing that a narrow interpretation of the
Confrontation Clause is consistent with the Framers' intent). "A narrow
definition of 'interrogation,' limited to the 'colloquial' understanding of a
coercive, formal, and structured environment is fully consistent with the
original intent of the Clause." Id.
227. See Graham, supra note 85, at 209 (characterizing the movie version of
Justice Scalia's historical rhetoric as "Sir Walter Raleigh Came Over on the
Mayflower and Other Stories My Evidence Teacher Taught Me"). "Justice
Scalia's majority opinion tells a version of the history of the Confrontation
Clause that would do Hollywood proud. But unless they wish to operate on
the same level of 'truth' as 'reality TV,' lawyers should know better." Id.
228. See Brief as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, supra note 106, at
app. 65a (discussing the woman's state of mind when confronting her abuser).
229. Id. The victim's anonymous letter goes on to say, "[n]o victim should
have to face their antagonist. Fear-not the abuse itself-is the major
part... that keeps a victim in their helpless position." Id.
230. See Wheaton, supra note 83, at 219-22 (discussing the rationale for the
hearsay rule); see also supra note 83 and accompanying text (concluding that
the most accepted rationale for excluding hearsay is the inability to crossexamine the declarant).
231. See Brief as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, supra note 106, at
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E. Recognizing the Need for State-DrawnRemedies: "There
aren't many real walls, it's open-plan, all partitions.
' 2 32
In light of this discussion, Crawford and Davis damage
domestic violence prosecutions where hearsay evidence is often
essential and confrontation impracticable. 233 Perhaps the Court
should have retained the Roberts test for sole use in cases of
domestic violence. 234 Despite his attack on Roberts in Crawford,
Justice Scalia admits, in dicta, that states may still use Roberts in
conjunction with Crawford to determine the reliability of hearsay
statements. 235 In any event, the Court rejected Roberts, leaving
domestic violence victims in jeopardy and prosecutors in need of a
236
remedy.
Although legal scholars have suggested that forfeiture may be
the answer to the difficulties Crawford and Davis create, this
doctrine is insufficient. 237 In order for forfeiture to take effect, the
prosecutor must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
238
the defendant wrongfully procured the victim's absence in court.
If the victim is not present in court due to her fear of the
defendant, she cannot testify to any bad acts that deterred her
239
cooperation with the prosecution.

App. B, Part III, p. 63a - 81a (collecting stories of abuse by domestic violence
victims, recounting the trauma of testifying).
232. DOYLE, supra note 2, at 107.
233. See Beloof & Shapiro, supra note 174, at 3-4 (describing how domestic
violence is incompatible with the truth-finding function of American courts).
234. See Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66 (describing the test for a hearsay
statement's adequate "indicia of reliability"). The statement must "fall within
a firmly rooted hearsay exception" or bear "particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness." Id.
235. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68.
236. See generally Beloof & Shapiro, supra note 174, at 5-20; Karleen F.
Murphy, Note: A Hearsay Exception for Physical Abuse, 27 GOLDEN GATE U. L.
REV. 497 (1997); Jeanine Percival, Note, The Price of Silence: The Prosecution
of Domestic Violence Cases In Light of Crawford v. Washington, 79 S. CAL. L.
REV. 213, 263-64 (2005); Neal A. Hudders, Note, The Problem of Using
Hearsay in Domestic Violence Cases: Is a New Exception the Answer? 49 DUKE
L.J. 1041, 1071-74 (2000) (all proposing hearsay exceptions to be instituted in
domestic violence cases).
237. See Andrew King-Ries, Forfeiture by Wrongdoing. A Panacea for
Victimless Domestic Violence Prosecutions, 39 CREIGHTON L. REV. 441, 444
(2006) (proposing that forfeiture can overcome Crawfords negative impact).
The article suggests that the state establish forfeiture by either "specific
evidence of threats... or the existence of a battering relationship built on
power and control dynamics." Id.
238. Id.
The state must establish defendant's wrongdoing by a
preponderance of the evidence. Id.
239. Contra id. (claiming that reporting the forfeiture to authorities may be
enough). Compare id. with Brief as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents,
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Instead, state legislatures should adopt evidentiary hearsay
rules that will specifically address the problems presented by
domestic violence cases. 240 An instructive concept to examine is
241
the hearsay "gang exception" created by the state of California.
This exception "make[s] admissible into court sworn statements of
witnesses that have died by any manner other than natural
causes." 242 This rule targets the problem that exists in gangrelated prosecutions: key witnesses are killed before the case can
243
go to trial.
Although domestic violence and gang violence can be
distinguished, they both evade prosecution and punishment. 244 In
each case, victims are silenced. 245 And in each case, hearsay
evidence may be the only avenue for discerning some truth about
246
the criminal act.
California took its hearsay exception for gang violence one
step closer to domestic violence by creating a hearsay exception for
physical violence. 247 The California law provides that "evidence of
a statement by a declarant is not made inadmissible by the
supra note 106, at 23-23 (observing that a forfeiture argument will fail if the
victim will not appear at the forfeiture hearing).
240. See Andrew King-Reis, An Argument for OriginalIntent: Restoring Rule
801(d)(1)(A) to Protect Domestic Violence Victims in a Post-Crawford World,
27 PACE L. REV. 199, 231-32 (2007), for a discussion of Federal Rule of
Evidence 801(d)(1)(a) and its possible applicability to the domestic violence
context. Professor King-Reis suggests that prior inconsistent statements of
domestic violence victims (given to the police or prosecutors) should be
expanded and used as substantive evidence at trial. Id. King-Reis suggests
that prior inconsistent statements as substantive evidence will allow the jury
to fully consider the victim's testimony. Id. This suggestion, however, frames
domestic violence as a federal issue. Id. at 213-20. This Comment proposes
that states construct a new, domestic violence-specific hearsay exception,
rather than utilize an already-existing federal hearsay exception in the local
domestic violence context. Compare id. at 213-20 (describing the creation and
federal applicability of Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(a)), with infra notes
245-61 and accompanying text (suggesting that states should adopt hearsay
exceptions like those in Oregon and California that create a separate domestic
violence hearsay exception under Federal Rule of Evidence 803).
241. Erin Stepno, Review of Selected 1997 California Legislation: GangRelated Hearsay Exception, 29 MCGEORGE L. REV. 605, 607 (1998).
242. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1231(e) (2006).

243. See Stepno, supra note 242, at 607 (finding that the California hearsay
rule eliminates any "incentive a gang member would have to kill a witness").
244. Compare id. (discussing the California hearsay exception as it applies to
the gang epidemic), with Lininger, supra note 166, at 768-72 (discussing the
importance of hearsay in domestic violence prosecutions).
245. Compare Stepno, supra note 242, at 607 (discussing the death of key
witnesses in gang prosecutions), with Lininger, supra note 167, at 769-71
(pointing to "violent abusers" and "silent accusers").
246. Compare Stepno, supra note 242, at 607 (intending to use hearsay to
make gang prosecutions easier) with Lininger, supra note 167, at 771-72
(emphasizing the importance of hearsay in domestic violence prosecutions).
247. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1370 (2006).
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hearsay rule if ...the statement purports to narrate, describe, or
explain the infliction or threat of physical injury upon the
24
declarant." s
Perhaps most instructive is an Oregon evidentiary statute
that carves out a hearsay exception for statements of domestic
violence victims. 249 In the aftermath of Crawford and Davis, such
an exception may be the best way for states to avoid Davis's
ongoing emergency problem. 250 By instituting statutes similar to
the Oregon model, states will ensure that victim statements that
are deemed reliable under standards similar to those of Roberts,
251
are admitted at trial.
The Oregon statute provides that "[a] statement that purports
to narrate, describe, report or explain an incident of domestic
violence ...made by a victim of the domestic violence within 24
hours after the incident occurred" is an exception to the hearsay
rule even if the declarant is unavailable as a witness. 25 2 This
exception confronts the problem of prosecuting domestic violence
cases head-on. Other states should follow suit to ensure that
batterers will be held accountable for their criminal conduct. 25 3
Domestic violence victims will typically recant the accusations
against their batterer. 254 This deems victim statements made in
close proximity to the incident more truthful than even those
statements that the victim might make at trial. 255 In increasing
numbers of domestic violence cases, prosecutors put on

248. Id.
249. OR. REV. STAT. § 40.460 (26)(a) (2006).
250. See Rodriguez, 722 N.W.2d at 143-46 (showing the inconsistent
application of the Davis ongoing emergency terminology).
251. See § 40.460 (26)(b) (providing Roberts-like reliability factors).
252. Id. The victim statement taken within twenty-four hours of the
incident must have been recorded by a peace officer, emergency personnel or
firefighter, and must have "sufficient indicia of reliability." Id. The statute
then lists several factors to be used in determining reliability. Id. The Oregon
statute categorizes its hearsay exception under Federal Rule 803. Id.; FED. R.
EVID. 803. However, states following the Oregon model may wish to consider
the victim unavailable under Rule 804(a), and then add their hearsay
exception to the list of federal exceptions already provided in 804(b). FED. R.
EVID. 804(a), (b). This will bar any Crawford problem because when the
witness is deemed unavailable under an 804(a) analysis, she need not be
produced for cross-examination. See FED. R. EVID. 804(a) (deeming a witness
unavailable because of privilege, refusal to testify, a lack of memory, mental
illness or infirmity, or absence from the hearing with no foreseeable
procurement by the proponent of the evidence).
253. OR. REV. STAT. § 40.460 (26); see also Lininger, supra note 167, at 77187 (setting forth the legislation needed to combat domestic violence).
254. See Malhotra, supra note 29, at 213 (describing the problem of
recantation).
255. See OR. REV. STAT. § 40.460 (26) (2006) (recognizing that statements
made within 24 hours of the incident are the most reliable).

The John Marshall Law Review

[41:937

256
psychologists as expert witnesses to explain victim recantation.
The Oregon statute dispenses with this practice by ensuring that
the most accurate statements are admitted into evidence. 25 7 Other
state legislatures must move quickly to adopt analogous statutes
to ensure that accurate victim statements, essential to successful
domestic violence prosecutions, are admitted at trial.

IV. CONCLUSION: "HE WAS SPEAKING
ON MY BEHALF, FOR US BOTH." 256

Oregon's evidentiary scheme specifically addresses the
problems this discussion predicts will result from the Davis
decision. 25 9 Amy Hammon's affidavit, deemed by Davis to be
tantamount to a formalized police interrogation, now can only be
admissible under a statutory scheme like Oregon's. 260 For states
to allow only nontestimonial statements like those made by
Michelle McCottry during an ongoing emergency is to ignore the
261
nature of domestic violence and the unique needs of its victims.
When life is an ongoing emergency, how should the police
know if time has run out for an Amy Hammon? 262 How do they
know if it is a true emergency this time - if it is essential that
they be there? And if they are too afraid to ask her questions and
to use her answers, well then perhaps time has run out for each
and every Amy Hammon, for the millions of American women
263
whose voices will never be heard without a hearsay exception.
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